Assessing Confidence in an Assurance Case

John Goodenough Charles B. Weinstock Ari Z. Klein

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How confident in C1? Why?

What does it mean to have confidence?

What could be done to improve confidence? Why?



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The Philosophy of Confidence

Scientific, legal hypothesis testing

- Which hypothesis is best supported by the evidence?
- A distinguished history, starting with Aristotle*
 - Pascal (1654) (finite number of equally likely outcomes)
 - Bayes (1763) (belief)
 - Francis Bacon (1620) (eliminative induction)
- Assurance cases pose a somewhat different problem
 - Not comparing different hypotheses
 - How well is a given hypothesis (claim) supported
- Eliminative induction (Bacon [1620], Cohen [1970])
 - As reasons for doubt are eliminated, confidence (belief) grows
 - If we have no reasons for doubting a claim, we must accept its validity

* David A. Schum, The Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning, 1994.



Bermuda-born \Rightarrow British subject Harry was Bermuda-born

. Harry is a British subject



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Bermuda-born \Rightarrow British subject

Harry was Bermuda-born

. Harry is a British subject

Generalization; inference rule



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Bermuda-born \Rightarrow British subject

Harry was Bermuda-born

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Generalization; inference rule Premise



Bermuda-born \Rightarrow British subject Harry was Bermuda-born

. Harry is a British subject

Generalization; inference rule Premise Conclusion



Bermuda-born \Rightarrow British subject Harry was Bermuda-born

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C1 Harry is a British subject Generalization; inference rule Premise Conclusion

Conclusion



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Bermuda-born \Rightarrow British subject Harry was Bermuda-born

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Generalization; inference rule

Premise

Conclusion

Bermuda-born \Rightarrow British subject Harry was Bermuda-born

... Harry is a British subject

C1





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Bermuda-born \Rightarrow British subject Harry was Bermuda-born

... Harry is a British subject

C1





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Bermuda-born \Rightarrow British subject Harry was Bermuda-born

Ev1

... Harry is a British subject

C1



Bermuda-born \Rightarrow British subject Harry was Bermuda-born

Ev1

born in

... Harry is a British subject

C1



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Bermuda-born \Rightarrow British subject

Harry was Bermuda-born

. Harry is a British subject



Generalization; inference rule Premise Conclusion

Conclusion

Bermuda-born ⇒ British subject unless R, S, T, ...

Premise

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Bermuda-born \Rightarrow British subject

Harry is a British subject

Ev1

Harry was

born in Bermuda

Harry was Bermuda-born

. Harry is a British subject

C1



Premise



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 $\mathsf{Bermuda-born} \Rightarrow \mathsf{British} \ \mathsf{subject}$

Harry is a British subject

Ev1

Harry was

born in Bermuda

Harry was Bermuda-born

. Harry is a British subject

C1





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 $\mathsf{Bermuda}\text{-}\mathsf{born} \Rightarrow \mathsf{British} \ \mathsf{subject}$

Harry was Bermuda-born

. Harry is a British subject

Parents were not Bermuda citizens Harry was actually born in London Conclusion





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Bermuda-born \Rightarrow British subject Harry was Bermuda-born

. Harry is a British subject

Parents were not Bermuda citizens Harry was actually born in London Conclusion





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Bermuda-born \Rightarrow British subject Harry was Bermuda-born

. Harry is a British subject

Parents were not Bermuda citizens Harry was actually born in London Harry renounced his citizenship





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Enough About Harry; Give Me Some Code!



C1

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There are no egregious errors in the program

Egregious error: *Every* execution of a statement containing an egregious error will fail



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Enough About Harry; Give Me Some Code!





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Four Rebutting Defeaters





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What about other defeaters?

Some undermining defeaters

- Test oracle does not report test success accurately
- The test results do not apply to the current version of the code
- Assertions about what basic blocks have been executed are unreliable

Eliminating these defeaters

- Evidence/analysis showing oracle is reliable
- Evidence/analysis of the configuration management mechanisms being used
- Evidence/analysis shows reports of basic block executions are reliable

Note that the defeaters are independent

• Eliminating one does not eliminate others





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What about other defeaters?

An undercutting defeater

- What is the generalization being used here?
 - If all basic blocks are successfully executed (at least once), there are no egregious errors in any basic block
- Defeater: None; this is logically equivalent to the definition of egregious error





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What about other defeaters?

An undercutting defeater

- What is the generalization being used here?
 - No egregious errors in any basic block implies there are no egregious errors in the program
- Defeater: Not all basic blocks are identified
- Eliminating the defeater
 - Analysis of the method for finding basic blocks ensures none will be overlooked





Summary of Defeaters

8 defeaters for C2

- Four rebutting defeaters (BB execution success)
- Three undermining defeaters (oracle, configuration mgmt, BB assertion)
- Deductive undercutting defeater (is defeated by deduction)

Test case eliminates 3 (rebutting defeaters)

- In the absence of information about the other defeaters, the Baconian probability (belief) is 4 out of 8, expressed as 4/8
 - 4/8 is not a fraction; it is a measure of missing information
 - 0/8 does not mean the claim is false; it means we have no reason to believe the claim

If no reasons for doubt have been eliminated, we have no confidence in a claim

If we eliminate all reasons for doubt, we have no reason to doubt



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How confident in C1? Why?

Number of eliminated defeaters



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How confident in C1? Why? Number of eliminated defeaters What does it mean to have confidence? No reason to doubt



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How confident in C1? Why? Number of eliminated defeaters What does it mean to have confidence? No reason to doubt How to improve confidence? Why? Eliminate more defeaters



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Other Implications of this Approach

Multi-legged arguments

• The combined arguments eliminate more defeaters

Taking into account defeater likelihood

• Eliminating some defeaters gives more confidence than others

Evaluating the strength/value of evidence in terms of how many defeaters are eliminated or the importance of the eliminated defeaters

- Irrelevant evidence eliminates no defeaters
- Powerful evidence eliminates more defeaters than weaker evidence

Undermining defeaters address the "trustworthiness" of evidence



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Summary: A Basis for Assessing Confidence

Confidence is the degree of belief in a claim as measured by the number of eliminated defeaters

As more defeaters are eliminated, confidence grows (eliminative induction)

The three types of defeaters suggested by defeasible reasoning give a basis for finding defeaters

A confidence argument shows how identified defeaters are eliminated and gives insight into the basis for confidence in a system claim



Some References

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Contact

John B. Goodenough

Fellow Telephone: 412-268-6391 Email: jbg@sei.cmu.edu

U.S. Mail: Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University 4500 Fifth Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890





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