

Towards Reusing Formal Proofs in Verification of Fault-Tolerance

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*Automated Formal Methods
(AFM'06)*

Motivation

- We need to gain confidence on the correctness of fault-tolerance properties.
- In the literature, the main focus has been on verification of concrete fault-tolerant systems.
- We need more general verifications, so that we are not required to verify individual programs.

Motivation (cont.)

We verify the correctness of algorithms that synthesize fault-tolerant programs ; all synthesized programs will be correct-by-construction.

We use the theorem prover PVS
as our verification tool.

Outline

- Review of previous results [LOPSTR'04, TPHoLs'04]
 - A formal framework for fault-Tolerance
 - A fixpoint calculation library on finite sets
 - Mechanical verification of automatic addition of fault-tolerance
- Mechanical verification of automatic synthesis of multitolerance by reusing formal proofs [AFM'06]
- Conclusions and future work

Levels of Fault-Tolerance

- ***Nonmasking***: A program is nonmasking fault-tolerant, if after occurrence of faults it eventually recovers to its normal behavior.
- ***Masking***: A program is masking fault-tolerant, if after occurrence of faults it eventually recovers to its normal behavior without violating safety.

A Fault-Tolerance Framework in PVS

FT [state : **TYPE**]: **THEORY**

BEGIN

ASSUMING

ST_is_finite : **ASSUMPTION** is_finite_type[state]

State is a finite type

TR_is_finite : **ASSUMPTION** is_finite_type[[state, state]]

Transition is a finite type

ENDASSUMING

Transition: **TYPE** = [state, state]

StatePred: **TYPE** = finite_set [state]

Action: **TYPE** = finite_set [Transition]

set of transitions

Computation (Z: Action): **TYPE** = { A: sequence[state] | $\forall n: (A_n, A_{n+1}) \in Z$ }

StateSpace: StatePred = fullset [state]

The state space

S: StatePred

invariant of fault-intolerant program

p: Action

program


f: Action

set of faults

Σ_{bt} : Action


set of bad transitions

The Synthesis Problem



Automatic Synthesis of Nonmasking Tolerance

- $S' = S$
- $p' = p \cup \{(s_0, s_1) \mid s_0 \in T - S \wedge s_1 \in S\}$




Automatic Synthesis of Masking Tolerance

Step (1): Identifying the set of states and transitions from where safety may be violated by a sequence of fault transitions.


$$mt = \{(s_0, s_1) \mid s_1 \in ms \vee (s_0, s_1) \in \Sigma_{bt}\}$$

S_p



Automatic Synthesis of Masking Tolerance (cont.)

Step (2): Identifying and removing deadlock states



A Fixpoint Theory on Finite Sets

Suppose X is a state predicate and $g(X)$ denotes the set of deadlock states of X :

$$X_1 = X - g(X)$$

$$X_2 = X_1 - g(X_1)$$

⋮

$$X_n = X_{n-1} - g(X_{n-1}) \text{ where } g(X_{n-1}) = \emptyset$$

$$X_n = X_{n-1}$$

$$X_{n+1} = X_n$$

Largest Fixpoint

DecFunc: **TYPE** = $[A : \text{StatePred} \rightarrow \{B : \text{StatePred} \mid B \subseteq A\}]$

Dec ($i : \text{nat}$, $X : \text{StatePred}$)($g : \text{DecFunc}$): **RECURSIVE StatePred** =

IF $i = 0$ **THEN**

X

ELSE

$Dec(i-1, X)(g) - g(Dec(i-1, X)(g))$

ENDIF

MEASURE ($\lambda (x : \text{nat}, y : \text{StatePred}): x$)

LgFix ($X : \text{StatePred}$)($g : \text{DecFunc}$): **StatePred** =

$\{s \mid \forall (k : \text{nat}): s \in Dec(k, X)(g)\}$

Largest Fixpoint and Deadlock States

Theorem [LOPSTR'04]: Further recalculation of fixpoint returns the empty set :

$$g (LgFix (X)(g)) = \emptyset$$

DeadlockStates (p : **Action**)(ds : **StatePred**): **StatePred** =
 $\{s_0 \mid (s_0 \in ds) \wedge (\forall s_1: (s_1 \in ds) \Rightarrow (s_0, s_1) \notin p)\}$

S_1 : **StatePred** = $LgFix (S - ms)(DeadlockStates(p - mt))$

Automatic Addition of Masking Fault-Tolerance

Let $T_1 = true - ms$

Repeat

- Recalculate S_1 and T_1 such that:
 - S_1 is reachable from all states in $T_1 - S_1$.
 - T_1 is closed in $p_1 \cup f$.

Until S_1 and T_1 remain unchanged


Remove cycles from $T_1 - S_1$

Automatic Synthesis of Multitolerance [DSN'04]

- *Multitolerant programs* tolerate different classes of faults and provide different level of fault-tolerance to each class.
- If faults from different classes occur, the multitolerant program provides the minimum level of fault-tolerance:

Level of FT	<i>Nonmasking</i>	<i>Masking</i>
<i>Nonmasking</i>	Nonmasking	Nonmasking
<i>Masking</i>	Nonmasking	Masking

Revisiting the Synthesis Problem



Generalizing Formal Specification

```
add_multift [state : TYPE]: THEORY
```

```
BEGIN
```

```
  IMPORTING add_nonmasking[state]
```

```
  IMPORTING add_masking[state]
```

```
 $f_{nonmasking}$ : Action  
 $f_{masking}$ : Action  
 $f_{nonmasking-masked}$ : Action =  $f_{nonmasking} \cup f_{masking}$ 
```

```
msInit(anyFault : Action) : StatePred =  
  { $s_0 \mid \exists s_1 : ((s_0, s_1) \in \text{anyFault} \wedge (s_0, s_1) \in \Sigma_{bt})$ } // faults directly violate safety
```

```
RevReachStates(anyFault : Action)(rs : StatePred) : StatePred = // backward reachability  
  { $s_0 \mid \exists s_1 : (s_1 \in rs \wedge (s_0, s_1) \in \text{anyFault} \wedge s_0 \notin rs)$ }
```

```
ms(anyFault : Action) : StatePred =  
  SmFix (msInit(anyFault))(RevReachStates(anyFault)) // Fixpoint of RRS
```

Formal Spec. of Nonmasking-Masking Synthesis

// invariant

$S' : \text{StatePred} = \text{add_masking} \cdot S_1(f_{\text{masking}})$

// intermediate program transitions

$p_1 : \text{Action} = \text{add_masking} \cdot p_1(f_{\text{masking}})$

// faults-span

$T_1 : \text{StatePred} = \text{add_masking} \cdot T'(f_{\text{masking}})$

// program transitions

$p' : \text{Action} = \text{add_nonmasking} \cdot p'(T_{\text{masking}}(f_{\text{nonmasking_masking}}), p_1(f_{\text{masking}}))$

Verification of Synthesis of Multitolerance

1- Theorems involving fixpoint calculations.

Theorem (1): All computations of a nonmasking- masking program are infinite:

$$DeadlockStates(p')(S') = \{\}$$

Formal Proof of Theorem (1)

|-----
 {1} $DeadlockStates(p')(S') = \emptyset$

Rule? (**expand "S' "**)

theorem1 :

|-----

{1} $DeadlockStates(p')$
 $(LgFix (S - ms))$
 $(DeadlockStates (p - mt))$

Rule? (**lemma "theorem1"**)

Applying theorem1

this simplifies to:

theorem1 :

{-1} $\forall (X: StatePred[state], g:$
 $DecFunc[state]):$

$g (LgFix(X)(g)) = \emptyset$

|-----

[1] $DeadlockStates (p')$
 $(ConstructInvariant (S - ms, p$
 $- mt)) = \emptyset$

Rule? (**inst -1 " S - ms"**)

"DeadlockStates(p)'")

Instantiating quantified variables,

Q.E.D.


More Theorems...

2- Theorems involving induction and case analysis.

Lemma (1) : In the presence of faults, no computation prefix of a nonmasking-masking program that starts from a state in S' , reaches a state in ms :

$$\forall j: (\forall c: \text{prefix}(p' \cup f_{\text{masking}}, j) \mid c_0 \in S' : \\ \forall k \mid k < j: c_k \notin ms)$$

Proof Idea on Satisfying Safety



More Theorems...

3- Theorems involving only application of another theorem.

Theorem (2) : In the presence of faults, no computation prefix of a failsafe fault-tolerant program that starts from a state in S' violates safety:

$$\forall j: (\forall c: \text{prefix}(p' \cup f_{\text{masking}}, j) \mid c_0 \in S' : \\ \forall k \mid k < j: (c_k, c_{k+1}) \notin \Sigma_{bt})$$

Proof : By applying Lemma (1).


More Theorems...

4- Theorems involving application of a combination of other lemmas, theorems, and possibly other things.

Theorem (3) : In the presence of faults, any computation of a nonmasking-masking program that starts from a state in the state space, reaches the invariant S' :

$$\forall c (p \cup f_{\text{nonmasking-masking}}) : (\exists j \mid j > 0 : c_j \in S_1).$$

Proof Idea



Future Work

- Developing proof strategies
- Verifying the correctness of other synthesis algorithms that:
 - Add fault-tolerance to real-time programs
[Bonakdarpour and Kulkarni, SSS'06]
 - Enhance the level of fault-tolerance
[Kulkarni and Ebnenasir, ICDCS'03]

Problem Statement

- **Soundness:** Given, S, p, f, Σ_{bt} , If p' is the set of transitions of fault-tolerant program with invariant S' :
 1. $S' \subseteq S$
 2. $p' \subseteq p$
 3. p' is fault-tolerant (nonmasking / masking) from S'